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Abstract 
 
The world financial crisis initiated in 2008 may have affected the international financing mix of firms in Brazil 
and  their  determinants,  given  its  aftereffects.  Financial  crisis  are  recurrent  events  with  varying  degrees  of 
severity. Many public Brazilian firms use international financing in their capital structure mix and it is relevant 
to understand their behavior during international crises. Thus, our goal was to investigate the foreign financing 
mixes  of  Brazilian  listed  companies  before  (2004)  and during  the  2008  world  financial  crisis  by  means  of 
descriptive  and  probit  regression  analyses  of  their  components  and  determinants  at  the  end  of  these  years. 
Brazilian companies usage of Eurobonds fluctuates with the value of the real (R$) and is still small considering 
the size of Brazil’s economy. Short-term financing and bank loans, domestic and foreign, decreased in 2008 and 
were replaced by domestic and international bonds and American Depository Receipts (ADRs). Firms  with 
foreign shareholders more often resorted to foreign capital markets and their presence became a more important 
determinant in 2008, while the other determinants did not change. Firms that employ international debt tend to 
use  all  other  sources  of  financing  more  often.  International  bank  loans  may  be  the  first  step  to  reduce 
international financing constraints.  
 
Key words: financial crisis; international corporate financing; capital structure; Brazilian listed firms.  
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Introduction 
 
 
The world financial crisis initiated with the subprime crisis in 2007 in the United States (USA) 
and spread around the globe. Its outcome is still uncertain. Roubini (2009) believed that the worst was 
yet to come. The crisis affected capital availability and an ensuing credit crunch reached emerging 
markets, Brazil included, possibly affecting the mix and the terms of their domestic and international 
financing. Even though there was an initial perception that the effects of the crisis were minor in 
Brazil, the recurrence  of  financial  crises  motivates  a  comparative  analysis  of  the  behavior  of  the 
domestic-international  mix  and  of  the  determinants  of  the  international  financing  mix  before  and 
during the crisis (Bacha & Goldfajn, 2009; Dooley & Hutchison, 2009; O. Barros & Giambiagi, 2009).  
We investigate, thus, the determinants of the international financing components of the capital 
structure of non-financial Brazilian exchange listed companies before (2004) and during the world 
financial  crisis  (2008).  We  present  descriptive  financial  and  capital  structure  company  statistics, 
according  to  their  sources  of  international  financing,  and  an  analysis  of  the  determinants  of 
international financing before and during the world financial crisis.  
The  contributions  of  this  article  are  a  qualitative  discussion  of  the  potential  impact  of  the 
financial crisis on credit constrained firms in emerging markets, which leads to testable hypotheses, 
and a comparative empirical analysis of capital structure indicators and of the determinants of its 
international components in Brazil before and during the crisis to verify if the evidence supports them. 
In any case, the evidence presented is preliminary for several reasons: the crisis is still unfolding and 
we  derive  our  conclusions  from  a  comparison  of  two  years  in  one  specific  country.  General 
conclusions could only be drawn from the testing of a general theoretical model of the impacts of the 
crisis, or of credit constraints, on firms.   
Our  empirical  analysis  contemplates  the  domestic  as  well  as  the  international  portions  of 
Brazilian  corporate  financing.  We  are  interested  in  the  dynamics  of  the  relative  importance  of 
international financing sources and, therefore, cannot ignore the domestic financing side. It is possible 
that  from  2004  to  2008  there  were  relevant  changes  in  the  proportions  financed  abroad  and 
domestically.  Likewise,  we  cannot ignore the  equity  portion  and,  thus, it is also  considered. The 
comparative analysis of the years 2004 and 2008 considers both a domestic-international dimension as 
well  as  an  equity-debt  dimension.  However,  our  emphasis  is  on  the  international  components  of 
Brazilian corporate financing.   
Our preliminary analysis suggests that Brazilian non-financial listed firms suffered the impacts 
of the crisis. Usage of short-term debt decreased during the crisis, particularly banking loans. Larger 
firms were able to replace short-term financing with long-term financing, mostly using capital markets 
(domestic bonds, Eurobonds, and ADR issuance). Firms that access international capital markets tend 
to  use  all  sources  of  domestic  and  foreign  funding  at  their  disposal.  They  have  a  more  marked 
presence of foreign shareholders, which became a more significant determinant in 2008, and boast 
better  corporate  governance  scores.  Firms  without  international  bank  loans  may  be  the  most 
financially constrained among non-financial listed firms.   
The  next  section  presents  a  literature  review  on  the  credit  crunch  in  the  U.S.  repurchase 
agreements  (repo)  market  and  of  credit  constraints  and  how  this  affected  emerging  markets  and 
companies, the changes in regulatory paradigms after the crisis and their potential effects, as well as a 
review  of  the  Brazilian  related  evidence  and  a  brief  comparative  analysis  of  Brazilian  Eurobond 
financing before and during the crisis. Third section presents the procedure and model while fourth 
section offers a descriptive comparative analysis of capital structure indicators of our sample and the 
analysis of capital structure determinants for a year prior to the global financial crisis and the crisis 
year of 2008. Final section concludes the article.  
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Background and Literature Review 
 
 
The financial crisis in the US 
 
This article will not discuss the details of the financial crisis. Those have been covered by many 
studies, which include the broad analyses in Acharya and Richardson (2009) and also those collected 
by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (2009) and by Eichengreen and 
Baldwin (2008), among  others.  Bacha  and  Goldfajn  (2009)  and  O.  Barros and  Giambiagi  (2009) 
provide a Brazilian view of the crisis. This section will, conversely, present a financial approach to the 
U.S.  banking  crisis,  placing  particular  emphasis  on  the  price  of  assets  provided  as  collateral  in 
repurchase  agreements  and  on  the  lack  of  liquidity  that  resulted  from  their  price  decline.  Repos 
correspond to what is known in Brazil as the overnight or the open market and boast an average daily 
trading volume in the USA of several trillion dollars. This discussion will serve as a background for 
the analysis of the potential effects of the crisis on Brazilian companies.  
Gorton (2009) and Gorton and Metrick (2012) believe that the 2008 global financial crisis was 
due to a loss of confidence in the U.S. financial system. When this happens, liquidity vanishes. An 
interesting and alternative approach regarding the dearth of liquidity in the world banking system 
attributes the generalized lack of confidence in banks to a loss in the value of some of the assets used 
as collateral in repo transactions. Even though losses have been restricted to some of the assets that 
served as collateral, the difficulty of identifying problematic assets and the banks that in fact held them 
led to a generalized run on banks. In this context, a run on banks in the repo market paralyzed the 
credit market, significantly reducing the ability of companies to obtain financing.  
Banks use part of their cash and time deposits to buy bonds. Most of these bonds are safe and 
risk-free, like the central government bonds of the countries in which they operate. These bonds also 
included securities  backed  by  very  safe  mortgages  and  not  quite  as  safe  mortgages,  as  was  later 
revealed. According to Gorton and Metrick (2009), safe bonds are those whose value does not depend 
on information and that are not subject to adverse selection. Assets whose value does not depend on 
obtaining and correctly interpreting information are considered to be information-insensitive. These 
assets are very liquid and traded without the need for private information and with no losses for 
insiders. Gorton and Metrick (2009) define liquidity as the ability to trade something quickly, without 
influencing its price and without the risk of the parties involved facing adverse selection. However, 
what happens when assets that are information-insensitive become sensitive?  
According to Gorton and Metrick (2009), a single sufficiently bad event is able to generate 
adverse selection. In this situation, assets that are considered to be immune to adverse information and 
are supposedly risk-free can no longer be regarded as safe. In this situation, it is very important to 
become the informed party in transactions involving these securities. When this occurs, uncertainty 
reduces trading volumes and market liquidity. As observed by Ivashina and Scharfstein (2010), despite 
the global scale of the crisis and its impact on all financial market participants, some banks were more 
affected than others. Yet, it was impossible for clients to know which counterparties would not honor 
their debts and, thus, even very safe securities lost value. Although clients could well believe that not 
all institutions would become insolvent, it was impossible to know which would be the most affected, 
and consequently a run on the banks took place. Clients withdrew their deposits before it was too late, 
reducing bank reserves and, consequently, the lending capacity of the financial system. Companies 
with repo operations backed by securities that were losing value found themselves in a worrisome 
situation because these securities had become unsafe and no longer provided an assurance that their 
end of the repo transaction would be fully honored.  
Gorton and Metrick (2009) define a haircut as the discount on the price of securities provided as 
collateral in repo transactions. The haircut is one percent if US$99 is offered as collateral for the 
repurchase of a US$100 bond. The authors recall that haircuts did not exist before the subprime crisis 
because  repo  market  agents  priced  securities  based on  the assumption  that they  were  immune  to A. Carvalhal, R. P. C. Leal    22 
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information.  The  authors  allege  that  the  more  risk-sensitive  securities  originated  from  real  estate 
transactions began to suffer haircuts after the crisis, including high-quality mortgage-backed securities. 
Acharya, Gale and Yorulmazer (2011) argue that the financial amount that a security is able to provide 
when used as collateral depends directly on how the information regarding its quality is revealed. The 
haircut on some securities reached 100 percent at the end of 2008, indicating that certain assets would 
not be accepted as collateral at all.  
Gorton and Metrick (2009) assert that the combination of a run on the banks and of a reduction 
in credit available for companies caused by the increase in the haircut created a financing difficulty for 
the banks. On the one hand, in order to provide collateral for repo operations, banks had to use 
securities  whose  total  nominal  value  was  progressively  becoming  greater  than  the  deposits  they 
guaranteed. On the other hand, as the bonds that were purchased with funds from demand and time 
deposits were losing value, doubts began to arise as to the actual creditworthiness of those deposits. 
Brunnermeier (2009) and Gorton (2009) affirm that banks had difficulties rolling over their short-term 
debt due to the concern of their clients about the solvency of the banking system during the crisis. 
Ivashina and Sharfstein (2010) contend that banks also suffered due the unexpected cutting of their 
lines of credit. The price of securities went down even further because banks were forced to sell those 
securities in their portfolios in face of a lack of credit and the need to reduce leverage, worsening the 
liquidity in the system. Gorton and Metrick (2009) explain that securities in banks’ portfolios thus 
became information sensitive, culminating in a reduction in market liquidity.  
Gorton (2009) affirms that the greatest problem in the subprime crisis resided in the fact that 
nobody imagined that risk was present and so close at hand. Dooley and Hutchison (2009) consider 
that one of the most impressive characteristics of this crisis lays in the absence of indicators showing 
that the U.S. economy was on the brink of disaster. They argue that the figures for industrial activity, 
exports  and  retail  sales  did  not  deteriorate  during  the  period  leading  up  to  the  Lehman  Brothers 
collapse.  We  proceed to  review  the  literature  about  the impact  of the credit crunch  on emerging 
markets.  
 
The crisis and emerging markets  
 
Dooley and Hutchison (2009) believe that the run on the banks that occurred in October 2008 in 
the  U.S.  was  a  determining  factor  in  the  paralysis  that  gripped  the  U.S.  credit  market.  The 
consequences of this event had a direct impact on other developed countries’ credit markets because 
their banks also came to have information-sensitive securities in their assets. Emerging markets also 
suffered with a lack of credit and a decline in economic activity. Dooley and Hutchison (2009) affirm 
that the imports and exports of many countries fell by approximately 30 percent between September 
2008 and January 2009 and that even countries with relatively few ties with the US were affected. The 
impacts in the Credit Default Swaps (CDS) market, for example, were also felt in emerging countries. 
The authors highlight that the default of Lehman Brothers affected all countries in a similar fashion, 
raising CDS spreads. CDS spreads for Brazil, Russia, and South Africa, for example, were hovering 
below 100 basis points (bps) before the crisis and climbed to the 200 bps level during 2008, jumping 
to the 400 bps level in 2009, with Russia and Turkey crossing the 800 bps level. In May of 2012 
Russia and Turkey are back to the 300 bps level while Brazil and South Africa CDS levels are slightly 
below 200 bps according to Deutsche Bank Research (http://www.dbresearch.com, retrieved on 2 June 
2012). The Lehman Brothers collapse put an end to the belief that emerging markets would escape the 
effects of the crisis in the U.S.  
Dooley and Hutchison (2009) argue that a decoupling between emerging countries and the U.S. 
did effectively occur before the beginning and even during the first months of the subprime crisis, but 
that an intense recoupling began to take place starting from August 2008. They assert that the crisis 
was  initially  underestimated  in  emerging  markets.  Roubini  (2009)  believed  that  the  whole  world 
would suffer even more with the shrinking of the U.S. economy and that not even emerging markets 
would  remain  unscathed.  Azevedo  and  Terra  (2009),  in  contrast,  contend  that  the  adoption  of  a 
floating exchange rate regime and improvements in economic policies rendered the impacts of this The World Financial Crisis and the International Financing   23 
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financial crisis on the non-financial portion of the Brazilian economy milder than those of the crises of 
1990s. Nevertheless, the subprime crisis had a negative impact on emerging countries, at least with 
respect to their bond prices and returns.  
The crisis in Brazil took the form of a liquidity crunch without serious solvency problems, 
according  to  the  analyses  in  Bacha  and  Goldfein  (2009)  and  O.  Barros  and  Giambiagi  (2009). 
Delinquency  rates  on  loans  remained  close  to  pre-crisis  levels.  The  most  important  channels  of 
contagion  were  the  lack  of  credit,  exchange  rate  devaluation,  and  more  pessimistic  expectations 
conveyed by a crisis of confidence that affected companies and consumers alike. Measures adopted by 
the  National  Monetary  Council,  the  ultimate  overseer  of  the  Brazilian  financial  market,  and  the 
Brazilian Central Bank (BCB) increased the liquidity in the domestic financial system and sustained 
credit levels. These measures included incentives for the acquisition of small bank assets by medium 
and large-sized banks, the reduction of compulsory deposit requirements, and an increase in deposit 
insurance for deposits of up to R$20 million, in order to provide relief mainly for small and medium-
sized banks. Bacha and Goldfein (2009) and O. Barros and Giambiagi (2009) list various additional 
measures adopted by the government in 2008 and 2009 to mitigate the effects of the crisis. In sum, 
they included those related to the exchange rate, new rediscounting mechanisms, the reduction of the 
short-term interest rate, cuts in compulsory deposit requirements, tax reductions, and state-owned bank 
transactions designed to restore credit flows.  
Yet, the crisis affected the performance of the external accounts of Brazil. Comparing end-of-
the-year BCB economic figures immediately before the crisis (2006) to those at the end of the main 
crisis year (2008) we verified that the current account balance fell dramatically from a surplus of 
US$14  billion  in  2006  to  a  deficit  of  US$28  billion  in  2008,  even  though  exports  increased 
substantially (US$198 billion in 2008 against US$138 billion in 2006). In the meanwhile, international 
reserves reached record levels, rising to US$194 billion at the end of 2008. The external debt reduction 
strategy pursued by the Brazilian Treasury since the mid 1990s paid off, which became especially 
evident during the crisis. The net external debt to exports ratio declined from 0.5 in 2006 to -0.1 in 
2008, while the net external debt to the gross domestic product (GDP) ratio fell from around 7 to -1.8 
percent in the same years, also according to the BCB statistics. This increased the level of confidence 
in the Brazilian economy and Brazil became an investment grade country sometime before the crisis in 
2008. The Brazilian country risk, despite increasing in 2008 (428 basis points by the end of the year), 
was below the Latin American and Asian averages (722 and 574 basis points, respectively). The initial 
assessment of the impacts of the crisis on Brazil by the government was that it would be negligible, 
perhaps relying  on the significant improvement  in  international reserves, exports,  and the  current 
account balance before the crisis. However, the deterioration in the current account revealed that there 
was a significant impact, albeit not as strong as in developed countries and some emerging countries. 
As Dooley and Hutchison (2009) observed, the link with the crisis became stronger after August 2008, 
lending support to the comparative analysis performed in this article of a year prior relative to a year 
during the crisis.  
 
Regulation changes  
 
Helleiner and Pagliari (2010) discuss the influence of the financial crisis on the international 
regulation  of  financial  markets.  According  to  these  authors,  international  prudential  regulations 
usually evolved as a response to crises. Bank capital adequacy under the Basel agreements led the way 
to  international  prudential  regulation  in  1988.  Regulatory  coordination  also  took  place  regarding 
securities markets, rating agencies, insurance markets, payment and settlement systems, and on to 
broader issues such as corporate governance, auditing and accounting standards. They observe that 
this  supranational  regulatory  framework  was  fractured  throughout  a  large  number  of  multilateral 
institutions and had predominantly a non-mandatory nature, with the real lawmaking and supervisory 
authority over each national financial market remaining under national jurisdictions. Rule makers in 
most international bodies consisted, by and large, of representatives of the major developed markets 
and emerging market participation was marginal. Finally, a key characteristic of this phase of the 
international financial regulatory framework was to let private actors have a significant role in its A. Carvalhal, R. P. C. Leal    24 
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development and supervision. Levine (2012) ads that even public regulators, who are not elected and 
were largely not monitored and held accountable, failed to act in the public good, bearing some of the 
responsibility for the crisis by continuously designing and implementing policies that contributed to 
the financial fragility of the financial system.  
The Group of Twenty (G20) first met in 2008 and includes the European Union and 19 other 
member countries, both developed and developing. It embraced recommendations set out by these 
same regulatory bodies after the crisis in a major policy setting change relative to the pre-crisis period. 
Developing countries representatives co-chaired the G20 working groups. Bank regulation was at the 
center of the reforms, especially regarding risk management, securitized products, liquidity and other 
prudential rules, as well as executive compensation disclosure rules, reflected in Resolution 3.921 
introduced  by  the  Brazilian  Central  Bank  in  2010,  for  example.  Credit  rating  agencies  and  their 
systemic risk influence were also addressed. The global financial governance has been strengthened 
through the creation of the Financial Stability Board (FSB) that works with the IMF in monitoring 
cross-border financial risks as well as to nurture and guide the work of international standards setting 
bodies. The FSB counts upon significant emerging market participation and was provided with much 
more  structure  than  previous  international  bodies.  This  supranational  regulatory  framework  still 
largely derives from networked forms of governance and is mostly non-binding and very flexible at 
the national implementation levels. On the other hand, FSB membership requires implementation of 
the  main  standards,  according  to  Helleiner  and  Pagliari  (2010).  A  major  change  from  previous 
principles is less reliance on market forces and on private parties to make and enforce rules, such as in 
credit  risk  management  and  credit  agencies,  and  greater  public  overseeing  of  private  rulemaking 
bodies. However, principles such as fair value accounting, private accounting standards setting, and 
the fractural nature of international bodies, now with a greater number of members, remain essentially 
unchallenged, as well as the unaccountability and lack of monitoring of public regulators (Levine, 
2012; Zimmermann, 2010).  
The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 is one of the most 
well-known and far reaching new pieces of regulation. It touches both U.S. and foreign institutions 
operating in and with U.S. institutions or trading their securities in the U.S.A., such as Brazilian 
companies with ADR programs (Tanoue, 2010). It gave more power to regulatory agencies, created 
systemic risk management power and advance warning entities, required greater transparency from 
hedge  funds  and  over-the-counter  derivatives,  increased  credit  rating  agencies  supervision  and 
accountability,  and  introduces  whistleblower  provisions.  The  law  allows  a  U.S.  shareholder  of  a 
Brazilian company, for example, to accuse and potentially put that company under investigation by 
U.S.  authorities.  The  law  also  allows  for  U.S.  authorities  to  prosecute  foreign  companies  for 
committing fraud in the U.S.A. and substantially harming U.S. citizens, even if their securities do not 
trade in U.S. markets, such as under an ADR 144A arrangement. Corporate governance provisions of 
the law also enhance regulation about claw-back provisions on executive compensation, for example. 
Naturally, financial risk management, capital adequacy, systemic risk, and crisis management are also 
tackled  by  the  law  and  may  reach  the  large  Brazilian  banks  operating  in  the  U.S.A.  Consumer 
protection aspects of the law may extend to Brazilian firms issuing securities in the U.S.A. or firms 
that extend credit to consumers, such as credit card companies. Natural resource companies will have 
to report about employee health and safety issues and taxes paid to all foreign entities where they 
operate. Thus, Brazilian firms must be very careful about the validity and accuracy of what they report 
(Tanoue, 2010). These and other provisions of the law represent additional costs to Brazilian and other 
emerging market companies and may change their foreign securities issuance patterns in the future.   
 
The crisis and companies  
 
Companies were affected by the lack of liquidity in the financial system and by the slower 
economic activity. Naturally, this effect was not uniform. Gorton and Metrick (2009) list various 
studies that conclude that returns on investment grade corporate bonds behave similarly to government 
bonds and are sensitive to information about interest rates but not to information about the companies 
themselves. Yet, speculative-grade corporate bond prices react to changes in share prices and company The World Financial Crisis and the International Financing   25 
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information certainly affects share prices. Acharya et al. (2011) suggest that investor expectations 
change  during  moments  of  crisis  because  bad  rather  than  good  news  becomes  the  norm.  In  this 
situation, positive company news are probably less frequent, reducing the value of company assets 
used as collateral, even if their intrinsic value remains unchanged, making debt rollover more difficult.   
The  volume  of  total  bank  credit  granted to  Brazilian  companies,  however,  remained  above 
R$380 billion, with a growing and significant volume of loans for working capital and a much lower 
and stagnant level of longer-term loans for the purchase of goods, according to BCB statistics. On the 
other hand, foreign credit granted to Brazilian companies took a sharp decline from its peak of R$30.6 
billion in November 2008 to R$15.2 billion in August 2009. Bank spreads have risen from below 12 
percent a year in the beginning of 2008 to a level of around 18 percent by the end of that year. Spreads 
have fallen since them.   
Campello,  Graham,  and  Harvey  (2010)  performed  a  timely  study  about  the  impact  of  the 
financial crisis on credit-constrained companies in the U.S.A., Europe and Asia. Instead of the usual 
measures of credit constraints, such as firm size and credit risk classification, they used a declaration 
from company officers obtained from questionnaires. The authors contend that their metric produces 
better  results,  in  terms  of  determining  the  characteristics  of  credit-constrained  firms,  than  those 
employed in seminal studies and that it establishes key differences between credit-constrained and 
unconstrained companies. Companies that consider themselves as credit constrained, henceforward 
simply referred to as credit-constrained companies, tend to have a worse credit risk classification, be 
less profitable, have lower growth rates, and have experienced constraints regarding access to lines of 
credit more often, whether in terms of cost or volume required. Surprisingly, credit constraints are not 
a function of company size, despite the frequent use of this latter variable in the literature.  
Campello et al. (2010) point out that credit-constrained companies were more likely to sell 
assets to finance their operations in 2008 than unconstrained companies. They conclude that credit-
constrained companies enact deeper cuts in research and development investments, personnel, capital 
investments, and dividend payments. Fifty percent of financially constrained companies revealed that 
they  had  shelved  attractive  investments.  Only  one  out  of  five  unconstrained  firms  displayed  this 
behavior. The authors add that credit-constrained firms are not able to implement their investment 
plans fully because they either have to pay far more for capital or are simply unable to obtain the 
necessary volume of credit due to their riskier nature. These companies probably resort more often to 
internally generated capital than their unconstrained counterparts. Ivashina and Scharfstein (2010) 
emphasize the importance of the bank-firm relationship. Firms that are clients of banks with liquidity 
problems  may  find  it  difficult  to  obtain  loans  from  other  banks  with  which  they  do  not  have  a 
commercial relationship, even if these banks have funds to lend.  
In  order  to  assure  their  liquidity  and  survival,  credit-constrained  companies  keep  a  larger 
percentage of their assets in liquid form and accelerate credit line withdrawals during crises in order to 
preserve  their  liquidity  (Campello,  Graham,  &  Harvey,  2010).  Credit-constrained  companies  may 
make preventive use of their lines of credit, keeping their external capital in reserve, in case they face 
problems renewing them. This behavior was not observed among unconstrained companies. During 
the  crisis,  there  was  a  significant  decline  in  the  volume  of  credit-constrained  company  reserves 
because  the  companies  used  them  to  finance  investments  and  operations.  The  reserves  of 
unconstrained firms remained stable. More than half the companies studied stated that they would opt 
to use their reserves to develop attractive projects if they could not obtain new financing, while 40 
percent  would  simply  consume  their  reserves  in  current  operations.  The  authors  point  out  that 
abandoning  investments  with  a  positive  net  present  value  reduces  the  speed  of  recovery  in  the 
economy.  
 
Brazilian literature on credit constraints  
 
Many non-financial Brazilian listed firms may be financially constrained. The financial crisis 
led to a credit crunch. Thus, it is reasonable to expect that financially constrained firms were hit A. Carvalhal, R. P. C. Leal    26 
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harder.  Crisóstomo  (2009)  suggests  that  Brazilian companies  face  credit  constraints  because  their 
investment in innovation is unstable and they used internally generated funds extensively in the 1995-
2006 period. Terra (2003) concludes that Brazilian companies were credit constrained in the 1987-
1997 period, with the notable exception of larger and multinational firms in the latter portion of her 
sampled years. Kalatzis and Azzoni (2009) affirm that capital-intensive Brazilian firms, in particular, 
face greater financial constraints in volatile times by means of a sample from the same time period 
used by Terra (2003). Costa, Paz and Funchal (2008) conclude that Brazilian firms that issued ADRs 
are not financially constrained for a 1995-2007 sample. Portal, Zani and Silva (2012) conclude that 
external financing by constrained companies is less sensitive to cash flow generation while internal 
financing is quite sensitive to it for a sample in the 1995-2005 period. The same is not observed for 
unconstrained  companies.  Finally,  an  unpublished  paper  by  Kirch,  Terra  and  Procianoy  (2010) 
concedes  that  investment  by  unconstrained  companies  is  not  affected  by  the  way  they  obtain 
financing. Investment of constrained firms, conversely, is sensitive to the availability of internal funds. 
These authors also suggest that industry is important to identify unconstrained firms.  
Lima,  Assaf,  Perera,  and  Silva  (2011)  examine  how  the  domestic  inflation,  interest  and 
exchange rates related to debt levels of 83 Brazilian public companies in the 1995-2007 period. They 
find that in the periods of greater uncertainty, such as around the floatation of the real and the Lula da 
Silva election, total corporate debt levels indicators rose with exchange rates and with interest rates in 
simple regression models. They used four measures of debt levels and only those based on total debt 
levels showed a significant relationship with the exchange rate and with the interest rate. Total debt 
indicators include short and long-term debt, as well as foreign and domestic currency debt. Thus, the 
rise of debt levels, particularly during more volatile periods, may be due to the use of more short-term 
debt or foreign currency debt, or a combination of those. Their multiple regression models are hard to 
interpret because the three independent variables are correlated and affect each other. Thus, their 
results suggest that exchange rates may be positively related to debt levels, which hints that many of 
the sampled companies display foreign currency debt and/or seek more short-term debt in difficult 
times.  There  is  a  survivorship  bias  in  their  analysis  because  the  authors  employed  only  those 
companies with data for the entire 1995-2007 period, certainly favoring those that are larger and more 
successful, which are supposedly the ones with easier access to financing. Finally, the authors find that 
relative debt levels increase while the domestic interest rate decreases, which is what one should 
expect.  
We computed the correlation between the year-end Brazilian real value of the U.S. dollar and 
net Eurobond issues figures obtained from the BCB and the BIS, respectively, between 1995 and 2008 
as -0.46, statistically significant at the one percent level. Companies tend to issue bonds abroad when 
the  Brazilian  real  appreciates  relative  to  the  dollar  and  foreign  exchange  rate  volatility  is  low. 
However, when the local currency depreciates and volatility increases, they tend not to roll their bonds 
over, generating net negative issues. Thus, the increase in total debt levels verified by Lima et al. 
(2011) when the U.S. dollar appreciates is probably due to a combination of increased short-term 
domestic borrowing and an appreciation of foreign currency debt values.  
The evidence for Brazilian firms seems to confirm that in times of crisis financially constrained 
firms  suffer  the  most  and  seek  more  short-term  domestic  debt  and  that  larger  firms  with foreign 
owners  and  ADR  programs  are  not  financially  constrained,  particularly  those  in  industries  where 
collateral assets are plentiful.  
Our first four hypotheses are derived from the credit constraints discussion in the previous 
sections:  
H1:  Larger,  and  possibly  less  credit-constrained  firms,  have  more  access  to  all  sources  of 
international financing: bank loans, Eurobonds, and ADRs;   
H2:  Firms  with  no  access  to  international  bank  loan  financing,  the  most  basic  type  of 
international  financing,  may  be  more  credit-constrained,  and  use  fewer  external  financing 
sources, both domestic and foreign, and possibly more internally generated funds;   The World Financial Crisis and the International Financing   27 
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H3: Brazilian non-financial listed firms, if they are mostly credit-constrained, will display a 
greater use of short-term financing, particularly from banks, in the crisis year;    
H4: Brazilian non-financial listed firms, if they are mostly credit-constrained, will display a 
greater  use  of  domestic  financing  sources  in  the  crisis  year  because  they  may  have  more 
established relationships with banks operating in Brazil.     
 
Determinants of capital structure  
 
L. A. B. C. Barros and Silveira (2008) offer a recent analysis of the determinants of the capital 
structure of Brazilian companies and also review previous Brazilian studies. Leal (2008) provides a 
survey of the capital structure literature with a focus on Brazil and emerging markets. Frank and Goyal 
(2008)  present  a  comprehensive  survey  of  theoretical  and  empirical  issues  of  this  subject.  The 
Brazilian articles and the literature therein suggest that Brazilian firms use more bank debt than debt 
securities issuance. Naturally, the role of domestic banks is important and, regarding long-term debt, 
the National Bank for Economic and Social Development (BNDES) cannot be overlooked as the main 
long-term lender in the country.  
There are some variables that are usually present and significant in studies of determinants of 
capital structure, which were labeled as the “reliable leverage factors” in the literature review by Frank 
and Goyal (2008, p. 176). Tangible assets are common debt collaterals and are not easily replaced by 
high-risk assets, and asset tangibility’s (T) relationship with leverage is reliably positive because the 
more tangible assets a firm has the greater its collateralization ability (Frank & Goyal, 2008). Larger 
firms may be more diversified, have greater longevity and a better reputation in the debt market and 
thus present lower default risk and, thus, Frank and Goyal (2008) report that the relationship between 
company size (S) and leverage is reliably positive. More profitable firms obviously generate more 
funds to invest and profitability (ROA) is usually negatively associated to leverage because firms 
prefer to use internally generated funds to debt according to the Pecking Order Theory (Campello et 
al., 2010; Frank & Goyal, 2008). Company growth potential usually maintains a negative relationship 
with debt because it may be easier for insiders to increase project risk at the expense of overlooking 
debt  holders,  increasing  the  cost  of  debt  (Frank  &  Goyal,  2008).  Growth  potential  has  been 
represented by Tobin’s Q (Q), which is a common proxy for it. The Appendix presents our operational 
definitions for these variables.  
L. A. B. C. Barros and Silveira (2008) employed some additional variables. Volatility (V) may 
be positively related to an increase in market value debt ratios because market values may decrease in 
periods of greater stock market volatility. The score of a corporate governance index (CGI) created 
and described in Leal and Carvalhal-da-Silva (2007a), which is greater when companies adopt better 
transparency and corporate governance practices and, consequently, borrowing for them should be 
easier, as is supported by the Brazilian evidence presented by Leal and Carvalhal-da-Silva (2007a) and 
L. A. B. C. Barros and Silveira (2008).  
We included two more variables to account for the international exposure of companies because 
our  dependent  variables  are  relative  measures  of  international  financing  sources:  exports  (E)  and 
foreign  shareholder  (F).  We  expect  that  exporting  companies  and  those  with  relevant  foreign 
shareholders could more easily access the international financial market and, thus, present greater 
international debt ratios.  
These variables will be present in our model of the determinants of the international components 
of capital structure and two additional hypotheses are derived from their role in the models:  
H5:  Firms  tangibility,  size,  stock  price  volatility,  corporate  governance  practices,  export 
activity, and foreign shareholding will be positively related to their use of all international debt 
financing, while ROA and Q may be negatively related to international debt financing;   A. Carvalhal, R. P. C. Leal    28 
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H6: Firms that export, display better corporate governance practices or foreign shareholding 
will use all sources of international financing more.   
Finally, putting together the discussions about credit constraints and the determinants of the 
international components of capital structure of Brazilian non-financial firm, we see no reason to 
believe that these determinants would change with the crisis, hence our last hypothesis:  
H7: International financing is used more often by the larger and less credit-constrained firms 
and thus its determinants will not change in the crisis year.  
 
Eurobond financing in Brazil compared to other countries  
 
Usage of the international bond market by Brazilian companies was remarkably low considering 
the high domestic borrowing costs. Statistics computed by the Bank of International Settlements (BIS) 
reveal that Eurobond issues by non-financial Brazilian companies were merely about 1.2 percent of 
Brazil’s gross domestic product (GDP) by the end of 2008, down from about 1.5 percent in 2006. 
These figures are comparable to the average for Asian countries, while Eurobond issues amounted to 
about 4.8 percent of GDP for developed countries in 2006 and increased to about 5 percent of GDP by 
the end of 2008. The average figures for Latin American countries are more than twice of those of 
Brazil, as are those of some emerging market countries with greater country risk spreads, such as the 
Philippines (3.5 percent of GDP) and South Africa (2.4 percent of GDP).  
Emerging  markets in Latin America and Asia displayed a notable increase in liquidity and 
reserves before the crisis. We obtained the international liquidity for developed countries as the sum of 
portfolio  investments  and  financial  derivatives  and  other  investment  items  from  the  International 
Financial Statistics (IFS) database of the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The international crisis 
led to a significant reduction in international liquidity, which declined from US$8.5 trillion in 2006 
(US$10 trillion in 2007) to US$6.5 trillion in 2008, consistent with our recount of the financial crisis 
in previous sections. However, emerging Latin American and Asian countries’ international reserves 
increased substantially from US$2 trillion in 2006 to US$3 trillion in 2008, also according to figures 
obtained from the IFS and our own computations.  
Brazilian companies’ reluctance to issue abroad may be related to the availability of hedging 
and to foreign exchange risk. The supply of foreign currency hedge varies according to the volatility of 
the  nominal  exchange  rate.  In  periods  of  high  volatility  (2002  and  2008,  for example), the  BCB 
significantly increased its provision of foreign exchange hedging. The amount of foreign exchange 
hedging provided by the BCB rose dramatically in 2008 as well, when the exchange rate underwent a 
sharp devaluation. Brazilian companies use currency swaps and Non-Deliverable Forwards (NDFs) as 
their  main  hedging  means.  The  consolidated  notional  value  under  custody  of  the  two  types  of 
contracts, as expected, increased significantly during the crisis. We obtained figures from CETIP, a 
company  that  acts  as  a  Brazilian  market  integrator,  offering  registration,  custody,  trading,  and 
settlement of securities and assets. Currency swap (R$107 billion in 2006 and R$116 billion in 2008) 
and NDF (R$32 billion in 2006 and R$99 billion in 2008) amounts registered at CETIP increased 
substantially from 2006 to 2008.   
 
 
Procedure 
 
 
We chose 2004 to represent the pre-crisis financing structure because it was sufficiently distant 
from the beginning of the crisis and to compare our results with those of Leal and Carvalhal-da-Silva 
(2007b). We decided to examine the year-end information for 2008 as this was the most severe year of 
the crisis, as markets partially recovered in 2009 and 2010, despite all the difficulties still lingering in 
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We investigated which types of companies raise more funds in the international market by 
means  of  bank  loans,  Eurobonds,  and  ADRs,  before  and  during  the  crisis  through  a  descriptive 
comparative  analysis  of  firm  characteristics  and  financial  indicators  for  each  category.  The  tests 
include  a  comparison  of  selected  indicators  for  2004  and  2008  and  for  firms  with  and  without 
international bank, Eurobons, and ADR financing. We also estimated probit models for companies 
listed at the Bolsa de Valores, Mercadorias e Futuros (BM&FBovespa) in 2004 and 2008 with three 
dependent variables related to aforementioned international financing choices. We computed robust 
standard errors to correct for heteroskedasticity and correlation and also tested for multicollinearity, 
with the variance inflation factor lower than 10 for all variables. We ran the models for 2004 and 2008 
separately. The Appendix presents a list, description and computation method for each variable. The 
variables and the hypotheses were discussed in sections Brazilian Literature on Credit Constraints 
and Determinants of Capital Structure.  
Our model may be represented by Equation 1 where the dependent variable (Di) is one of the 
international financing dummies (Intbanks, Eurobonds, and ADRs), and the explanatory variables are 
tangibility (T), size (S), ROA, Tobin’s Q (Q), volatility (V), the CGI and the export (E) and foreign 
shareholder (F) dummies, as defined above, and ai, bi, and εi are the intercept, the coefficients of each 
explanatory variable, and the error term for firm i. The expected signs of each coefficient are collected 
in Table 4.  
  (1) 
Table  1  shows  the  industry  distribution  of  the  sample  according  to  international  financing 
sources. As expected, companies from industries that include very large companies, with substantial 
tangible assets in place, such as telecommunications, electricity, food, steel, metallurgy, and textiles, 
frequently tap international markets for finance. These results are consistent with those of Kirch et al. 
(2010), who advocate that industry is an important factor to discern constrained from unconstrained 
companies, and with our H5 hypothesis about asset tangibility and size.  
 
Table 1 
 
Number  of  Non-Financial  Brazilian  Listed  Companies  with  Access  to  the  International 
Financing by Industry in 2008 
 
Sector 
No. Comp.  International Banks  Eurobonds  ADRs 
2004  2008  W/O  With  W/O  With  W/O  With 
Electricity   33  39  19  20  29  10  27  12 
Other  26  47  31  16  42  5  32  14 
Steel and metallurgy   16  21  6  15  17  4  16  5 
Textiles  16  20  9  11  19  1  18  2 
Food and beverage   9  13  3  10  6  7  9  4 
Telecommunications   21  13  3  10  6  8  4  10 
Motor vehicles and parts   7  11  2  9  10  0  9  2 
Chemicals   15  11  3  8  8  3  9  2 
Transportation services   2  10  4  6  7  3  4  6 
Pulp and paper   7  6  2  4  4  2  3  3 
Construction   6  26  23  3  24  2  16  10 
Agriculture and fishing   5  4  1  3  4  0  4  0 
Continues 
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Table 1 (continued) 
 
Sector 
No. Comp.  International Banks  Eurobonds  ADRs 
2004  2008  W/O  With  W/O  With  W/O  With 
Industrial machinery   5  4  1  3  4  0  4  0 
Oil and gas   7  3  0  3  2  1  2  1 
Mining   3  2  0  2  1  1  1  1 
Commerce   5  7  6  1  7  0  5  2 
Electrical and electronics   7  5  4  1  5  0  5  0 
Insurance   1  3  3  0  2  1  3  0 
Non-metallic minerals   1  1  1  0  1  0  1  0 
Number of companies  192  246  121  125  198  48  172  74 
Note. Sectors ordered according to the number of companies with international bank loans. W/O means without. Source: 
data from Economatica – Tools for Investment Analysis (n.d.). Base de dados. Sao Paulo: Author, the Comissão de Valores 
Mobiliários (n.d.). Informações sobre as Companhias Abertas. Retrieved October, 2009, from http://www.cvm.gov.br, and 
author calculations. 
 
 
Empirical Findings 
 
 
Table 2 shows capital structure indicators, types of financing, and the financial costs of non-
financial  Brazilian  listed  companies  before  the  crisis  (2004)  and  during  the  crisis  (2008).  We 
performed statistical tests to evaluate if there were significant changes (in means and proportions) of 
capital structure indicators from 2004 to 2008. We analyzed all companies with available data in 2004 
and  2008  (192  and  246  firms,  respectively).  As  a  robustness  check,  we  also  evaluated  the  same 
companies in both years (128 firms) to check if our results could be due to sample changes from 2004 
to 2008. Overall the results were similar using unbalanced and balanced panels. 
In general, capital structures remained stable, with liabilities accounting for 59 percent of total 
assets. Short-term financing fell from 11.16 to 9.69 percent of total assets, while long-term financing 
increased from 13.29 to 18.15 percent of total assets. The decline in short-term financing and the 
increase  in  long-term  financing  are  statistically  significant  at  10%  and  1%,  respectively.  This 
comparison does not confirm the evidence of previous related works, such as Lima et al. (2011), as 
well as our H3 hypothesis.  
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Table 2 
 
Average  Capital  Structure  and  Financial  Indicators  of  Non-Financial  Listed  Brazilian 
Companies before and during the Crisis of 2008 
 
Indicators 
Unbalanced Panel  
Companies with Available Data 
Balanced Panel  
Same Companies in 2004 and 
2008 
2004  2008  Change   p  2004  2008  Change  p 
Number of Firms  192  246  28.13  NA  128  128  0.00  NA 
Total Assets (TA, R$ billion)  5,04  7,17  42.26  0,29  6,52  11,34  73.93  0,15 
Capital Structure                  
Liabilities/TA (%)  58,14  59,48  2.30  0,48  57,13  59,04  3.34  0,20 
Financing/TA (%)  24,45  27,84  13.87  0,02  24,14  28,56  18.31  0,01 
Short-term financing/TA (%)  11,16  9,69  -13.17  0,08  10,08  9,89  -1.88  0,21 
Long-term financing/TA (%)  13,29  18,15  36.57  0,00  14,06  20,67  47.01  0,00 
Types of financing                  
Domestic bank loans/TA (%)  16,62  14,92  -10.23  0,16  16,67  15,30  -8.22  0,17 
Domestic bonds/TA (%)  2,44  5,43  122.54  0,00  2,49  5,18  108.03  0,00 
International bank loans/TA (%)  7,83  5,23  -33.21  0,00  7,47  5,10  -31.73  0,00 
Eurobonds/TA (%)  1,29  1,53  18.60  0,57  1,42  1,52  7.04  0,86 
Share of international financing                 
% of firms with foreign banks   70,83  50,81  -28.26  0,00  71,88  57,19  -20.44  0,00 
% of firms with Eurobonds   19,27  19,51  1.25  0,95  21,88  24,22  10.69  0,66 
% of firms with ADRs   28,65  30,08  4.99  0,74  33,59  33,59  0.00  1,00 
Financial costs                  
Financial expenses/financing (%)  30,46  31,79  4.37  0,68  29,21  27,27  -6.64  0,46 
Other                 
Return on assets - ROA (%)  7,06  3,62  -48.73  0,00  7,08  4,24  -40.11  0,00 
Tobin’s Q   2,97  1,06  -64.31  0,00  3,03  1,11  -63.37  0,00 
Fixed Assets/TA (%)  46,07  33,56  -27.15  0,00  46,89  38,84  -17.17  0,00 
Voting shares largest shareholder 
(%)  63,64  54,32  -14.64  0,00  63,64  59,60  -6.35  0,25 
Total shares largest shareholder (%)  47,57  45,84  -3.64  0,47  45,68  42,86  -6.17  0,50 
Corporate governance index   7,53  12,88  71.05  0,00  7,86  11,35  44.40  0,00 
Annualized volatility (%)  67,44  61,52  -8.78  0,08  64,09  55,40  -13.56  0,04 
% of exporting firms   52,05  48,78  -6.28  0,55  49,52  50,00  0.97  0,94 
% of firms with foreign shareholders   42,71  67,41  57.83  0,00  38,28  51,56  34.69  0,03 
Note. Data from Economatica – Tools for Investment Analysis (n.d.). Base de dados. Sao Paulo: Author, the Comissão de 
Valores  Mobiliários  (n.d.).  Informações  sobre  as  Companhias  Abertas.  Retrieved  October,  2009,  from 
http://www.cvm.gov.br, and author calculations; Change is the percent change between 2004 and 2008; p is the p-value of a 
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There was a decline in bank loans relative to total assets (both domestic and international) and 
an increase in debt securities (domestic bonds and Eurobonds) relative to total assets. The increase of 
domestic bonds and the decline of international bank loans are statistically significant at 1%. The 
increase in the use of domestic bonds is supportive of our H4 hypothesis about the greater use of 
domestic financing sources in the crisis year. There was a significant decline in the percentage of 
companies with international bank loans and a slight increase (but not statistically significant) in the 
percentage of firms issuing Eurobonds and ADRs. The financial expenditures of companies increased 
during the crisis, as expected, but the results are not statistically significant. These results suggest that 
bank  loans  were  partially replaced  by  bond issues. Our  recount  of  the crisis impacts in  previous 
sections  revealed  that  international  financing  became  more  expensive  and  scarce  for  Brazilian 
companies during the crisis.  
Average profits (ROA) and the relative market value (Tobin’s Q) of companies were much 
lower in 2008 than in 2004. The decrease of ROA and Tobin’s Q is significant in both statistical and 
economical terms, maybe as a consequence of the financial crisis and the ensuing decrease in stock 
market values, as reported in Azevedo and Terra (2009). Corporate governance scores significantly 
improved  during  this  period  and  the  concentration  of  equity  capital  in  the  hands  of  controlling 
shareholders decreased. This last trend has been documented by Silveira, Leal, Barros, and Carvalhal-
da-Silva (2009) and Sternberg, Leal, and Bortolon (2011) and stems from the new listings at the 
premium listing levels of BM&FBovespa, which require more in terms of corporate governance and 
shareholder rights. Leal (2010) and Silveira et al. (2009) provide more details about these premium-
listing levels.  
Table  3  shows  capital  structure  indicators,  types  of  financing,  and  the  financial  costs  of 
companies according to their use or not of international financing by the end of 2008. As expected, 
larger  companies  with  significantly  more  tangible  assets  have  greater  access  to  all  modes  of 
international financing considered, in accordance with our H1 hypothesis. Moreover, companies that 
finance abroad employ more debt financing and use more long-term debt. These results are similar to 
those obtained by Leal and Carvalhal-da-Silva (2007b) before the crisis and are consistent with the 
findings of Terra (2003), Kalatzis and Azzoni (2009), and Costa et al. (2008).  
 
Table 3 
 
Average  Capital  Structure,  Types  of  Borrowing,  and  Financial  Costs  Indicators  of  Non-
Financial Brazilian Listed Companies According to their International Financing Sources in 
2008 
 
Indicators 
International Banks  Eurobonds  ADRs 
W/O  With  W/O  With  W/O  With 
Total assets (TA in R$ Billion)  2,43  11,77**  3,04  24,24**  2,13  18,90** 
Number of Companies  121  125  198  48  172  74 
Capital Structure             
Liabilities/TA (%)  53,15  65,61**  57,52  67,55**  59,33  59,81 
Financing/TA (%)  19,31  34,66**  25,66  33,07**  27,07  27,20 
Short-term financing/TA (%)  7,63  11,19**  9,71  8,35*  10,41  7,19** 
Long-term financing/TA (%)  11,68  23,47**  15,96  24,73**  16,66  20,02** 
Types of Financing             
Domestic bank loans/TA (%)  13,30  16,48**  15,77  11,37**  15,98  12,43** 
Domestic bonds/TA (%)  4,84  6,01  5,08  6,89*  5,17  6,06 
International bank loans/TA (%)  0,00  10,29**  4,63  7,69**  0,87  3,05** 
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Table 3 (continued) 
 
Indicators 
International Banks  Eurobonds  ADRs 
W/O  With  W/O  With  W/O  With 
Eurobonds/TA (%)  0,63  2,39**  0,00  7,82**  5,09  5,57 
Financial Costs              
Financial expenses/financing (%)  33,45  30,31  29,38  31,31  31,77  31,84 
Others             
Return on assets - ROA (%)  4,46  2,80**  4,15  1,42**  3,68  3,46 
Tobin’s Q   1,00  1,11**  1,04  1,12*  1,05  1,08 
Fixed assets/TA (%)  27,76  39,18**  32,21  39,15**  32,19  36,75* 
Voting shares largest shareholder (%)  51,41  57,09*  53,99  55,65  55,51  51,66 
Total shares largest shareholder (%)  44,80  46,82  46,41  43,55  48,01  40,97** 
Corporate governance index  13,44  12,34**  12,65  13,85**  11,88  15,22** 
Annualized volatility (%)  64,16  59,20**  61,65  61,07  60,66  63,07 
% of exporting firms  34,34  62,26**  48,75  48,89  52,94  40,58** 
% of firms with foreign shareholders  73,33  62,18**  61,93  87,50**  51,33  100,00** 
Note. Data from Economatica – Tools for Investment Analysis (n.d.). Base de dados. Sao Paulo: Author, the Comissão de 
Valores  Mobiliários  (n.d.).  Informações  sobre  as  Companhias  Abertas.  Retrieved  October,  2009,  from 
http://www.cvm.gov.br, and author calculations. 
* and ** indicate statistically significant differences at the 10 and 5 percent levels, respectively. W/O means without.  
Campello et al. (2010) contend that companies’ abilities to borrow without credit constraints 
was not significantly affected by the crisis. The larger companies in our sample could reasonably be 
described as such, as our results and those of Terra (2003) and Costa et al. (2008), suggest. Firms that 
raise bank loans abroad exhibit greater leverage, have lower financial costs, and enter into longer-term 
financing more often than companies that have not taken out foreign bank loans. In general, the former 
are large companies that have access to other financing sources, such as domestic bonds, Eurobonds, 
and ADRs. This result is supportive of our H2 hypothesis.  
Firms with international debt, either bank loans or Eurobonds, displayed a smaller ROA than 
other  firms.  Many  are  exporters  and  their  revenues  and  expenses  were  certainly  affected  by  the 
appreciation of the U.S. dollar in Brazil in 2008, a consequence of capital outflows. Table 3 shows that 
firms that issue Eurobonds also use the whole range of financing sources available to them because 
they tend to issue domestic bonds as well as to borrow from banks abroad more. Current liabilities 
finance 67.55 percent of the assets of companies that issue Eurobonds, as opposed to 57.52 percent in 
the case of those that do not. More than 87 percent of companies that issue Eurobonds have foreign 
shareholders and exhibit significantly better corporate governance practices, consistent with our H6 
hypothesis. It is also possible that companies that do not issue Eurobonds are amongst those that face 
more credit constraints.   
Firms with ADRs use more long-term financing, use less domestic loans and more international 
bank loans. It is noteworthy that companies that issue securities abroad, both bonds and ADRs, use 
less domestic bank loans, have foreign shareholders more often, exhibit higher corporate governance 
scores, present a more dispersed ownership structure, and employ more tangible assets, once again 
consistent  with  our  H5  and  H6  hypotheses.  These  results  suggest  that  these  firms  may  be  less 
financially constrained, also indicated by Costa et al. (2008). In contrast, firms that use international 
bank loans present fewer foreign shareholders and lower corporate governance scores but tend to be 
exporters. Exporting firms’ behavior is not consistent with our H6 hypothesis predicting that they 
would use all sources of international financing more. Maybe exporting firms do not need to use A. Carvalhal, R. P. C. Leal    34 
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international capital markets as much, given their ability to use the export cash flow as collateral for 
international bank loans.  
Finally, firms without Eurobond debt and ADRs use domestic bank loans significantly more, 
but firms without international bank loans use all sources of financing less, which indicates that the 
absence  of  international  bank  loans  may  identify  the  most  financially  constrained  firms  among 
Brazilian non-financial listed companies, in accordance with our H2 hypothesis. International bank 
loans may be the most common first step for international financing because very few companies 
without international bank loans display Eurobonds, but the opposite is not true.  
Table 4 shows that results of the regression models for 2004 are similar to those for 2008. The 
probit coefficients in Table 4 are also consistent with those obtained by L. A. B. C. Barros and Silveira 
(2008) who employed the System General Method of Moments (GMM-Sys). Our H7 hypothesis stated 
that international financing sources are more often used by less credit-constrained firms and, thus, 
their determinants should not have changed between 2004 and 2008. Companies with more tangible 
assets tend to use international bank loans more. There is a positive and significant relation between 
size and all forms of international financing (bank loans, Eurobonds, and ADRs). Larger firms have 
greater access to international debt and equity markets. According to Campello et al. (2010), firm size 
is commonly used as a proxy for credit constraint and the results in Table 4 suggest that larger firms 
face less credit constraints, as Terra (2003) and Costa et al. (2008) have also pointed out.  
 
Table 4 
 
Determinants of International Financing by Non-Financial Brazilian Listed Companies  
 
Variable 
Expected 
Sign 
2004  2008 
IntBanks  Eurobonds  ADRs  IntBanks  Eurobonds  ADR 
Tangibility  +  0,01*  -0,01**  0,01*  0,01**  0,01  0,00 
    (0,06)  (0,02)  (0,10)  (0,05)  (0,76)  (0,55) 
Size  +  0,04**  0,08**  0,03**  0,05**  0,03**  0,04** 
    (0,02)  (0,04)  (0,03)  (0,00)  (0,04)  (0,00) 
ROA  –  0,00  -0,01**  -0,01  -0,01*  -0,02**  -0,01 
    (0,85)  (0,04)  (0,66)  (0,08)  (0,00)  (0,19) 
Volatility  –  -0,01  0,00  -0,01***  -0,01*  0,00  -0,01* 
    (0,56)  (0,12)  (0,00)  (0,10)  (0,30)  (0,06) 
Tobin’s Q  –  0,04  -0,11  0,08  0,18  0,02  -0,11 
    (0,29)  (0,11)  (0,27)  (0,14)  (0,90)  (0,35) 
CGI  +  0,00  0,60**  0,09**  -0,03**  0,80**  0,04** 
    (0,96)  (0,03)  (0,02)  (0,00)  (0,00)  (0,04) 
Exports  +  0,15*  0,04  -0,10  0,33**  0,02  -0,08 
    (0,10)  (0,81)  (0,52)  (0,00)  (0,76)  (0,31) 
Foreign shareholders   +  0,11  0,04*  0,01  -0,02  0,22**  0,43** 
    (0,25)  (0,07)  (0,92)  (0,83)  (0,01)  (0,00) 
No. of observations    192  192  192  246  246  246 
R
2    0,09  0,12  0,29  0,29  0,14  0,21 
Note. Probit regressions models for companies listed at BM&FBovespa. The models were run for 2004 and 2008 separately and 
using three dependent variables related to international financing. All variables defined in the Appendix. Robust standard errors 
were computed to correct for heteroskedasticity and correlation and all p-values are in parenthesis. Sources: Economatica – 
Tools  for  Investment  Analysis  (n.d.).  Base  de  dados.  São  Paulo:  Author,  the  Comissão  de  Valores  Mobiliários  (n.d.). 
Informações sobre as Companhias Abertas. Retrieved October, 2009, from http://www.cvm.gov.br, and author calculations. 
* and ** indicate statistically significant differences at the 10 and 5 percent levels, respectively.  The World Financial Crisis and the International Financing   35 
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More profitable companies tend to use less foreign debt, both bank loans and Eurobonds. This 
result is consistent with the idea that profitable companies are able to retain part of their profits to 
finance their operations, especially when the cost of credit is high. This is consistent with the Brazilian 
evidence in Portal et al. (2012), for example. Campello et al. (2010) affirm that credit-constrained 
companies  use  more  internal  capital  and  try  to  remain  more  liquid,  reducing  their  liquidity  and 
dividend payments during periods when credit is scarcer, in order to try to maintain their level of 
investments. Volatility is inversely related to the issuance of ADRs; that is, companies with ADRs 
present a lower level of total risk. The quality of corporate governance practices and the presence of 
foreign  shareholders  are  positively  related  to  usage  of  capital  market  financing  (Eurobonds  and 
ADRs).  
There  was  a  positive  association  between  exports  and  financing  through  international  bank 
loans. Curiously, no relationship was found between exports and Eurobond and ADR financing. A 
possible  explanation  is  that  exporting  companies  usually  have  access  to  relatively  low  cost 
international  bank  lines  guaranteed  by  their  export  cash  flow.  With  the  exception  of  the  export 
dummy, the other variables, by and large, behaved in accordance with our H5 hypothesis.  
 
 
Conclusions  
 
 
Contrary  to  the  various  positive  views  put  forward  regarding  the  recovery  of  the  world 
economy, Roubini (2009) believed that the crisis was in its initial stages, that there are many bubbles 
that still have to be burst and that assets will probably continue to lose value. Shiller (2009) forecast 
that the world economy would not recover in the short term. The advent of discounts (haircuts) on 
securities that served as collateral in the repo market, highlighted by Gorton and Metrick (2012), were 
at the root of bank runs in this market and led to a credit crunch. We investigated if the intensity, 
composition and determinants of international financing of Brazilian non-financial companies changed 
from before to during the crisis.  
The Eurobond issuance of Brazilian companies relative to its GDP is small compared to that of 
other emerging economies. There is more foreign debt financing when the Brazilian real is stronger.  
We compared end-of-the-year capital structure indicators for a year that was clearly removed 
from the crisis period (2004) with the same kind of information for the crisis year of 2008. We did not 
look into more recent years, in which there was a partial recovery, at least in many emerging markets 
and some developed markets, because we wanted to examine the potential consequences of the 2008 
financial crisis and ensuing credit crunch. We examined only non-financial Brazilian listed companies.  
Short-term  financing  decreased  substantially  by  the  end  of  2008  while  long-term  finance 
increased.  The  average  share  of  bank  loans,  both  domestic  and  foreign,  decreased,  while  bond 
issuance, both domestic and foreign, increased in the same period. This suggests that bank loans were 
partially  replaced  by  bond  issuance.  The  percentage  of  companies  using  international  bank  loans 
decreased substantially, while there was no significant change in the percentage of companies using 
Eurobonds and a slight increase in the percentage of companies issuing ADRs. Previous works could 
lead us to believe that Brazilian companies, potentially more credit-constrained, would switch into 
more short-term domestic financing in periods of crisis; however, this did not happen. Maybe the 
nature of this crisis, a major bank credit crunch, led to a different behavior, with a significant reduction 
in the use of bank loans, both domestic and international. Financial expenditures increased, but not 
significantly, even in the event of the rise in country risk and credit crunch. Average profitability and 
relative market values were much less by the end of the crisis year than in 2004. These results suggest 
that short-term bank loans may have been partially replaced by long-term debt securities, and maybe 
equity in some cases, when we compare pre-crisis to year-end figures of the crisis year. However, we 
cannot  attribute  this  trend  to  the  crisis  because  other  relevant  events,  such  as  the  success  of  the 
premium listing segments of BM&FBovespa, may have significantly contributed to it.  A. Carvalhal, R. P. C. Leal    36 
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Larger firms employ all foreign financing sources more often and much more intensively. When 
a firm uses international bank loans it also tends to use Eurobonds and ADRs more often. Firms 
examined that use all sources of international financing tend to score better in corporate governance 
practices,  are  export  oriented,  and  include  foreign  shareholders.  Firms  that  are  certainly  less 
financially constrained, such as those using all of the international financing sources, seem to have 
replaced international bank loans with bond issues, domestic and foreign. The use of the domestic 
bond market is not significantly different between firms with and without foreign financing. Firms that 
issue securities abroad achieve higher corporate governance scores and have foreign shareholders 
more frequently. We noticed no major change in the potential determinants of capital structure from 
the pre-crisis to the crisis year, which were consistent both before and during the crisis with previous 
Brazilian evidence.  
Firms without international bank loans are probably among the most financially constrained 
among non-financial Brazilian firms because they also employed significantly fewer domestic bank 
loans  and  rarely  rely  on  Eurobonds.  On  the  other  hand,  companies  that  issued  Eurobonds  also 
exhibited significantly more international bank loans and significantly fewer domestic bank loans, 
suggesting  that  they  have  replaced  higher  cost  domestic  bank  loans  with  international  financing, 
possibly becoming less constrained. Our results suggest that international bank loans may be the first 
step towards a broader use of international financing sources and that their presence may indicate less 
financially constrained firms. The absence of international bank loans may be a stronger proxy for 
financial constraint than the absence of ADRs, for instance.  
We did not measure credit-constraint directly, but simply assumed that larger firms that use 
fewer international bank loans are among the most credit-constrained non-financial listed firms in 
Brazil. We also did not employ a theoretical model that offers direct testable hypotheses of the effect 
of this specific financial crisis over firms in Brazil. We have simply compared two years and inferred 
credit-constraint from firm characteristics. These limitations render our results as preliminary and 
warrant avenues for future research. In particular, credit-constraint could be measured through more 
detailed firm information, as well as firm declarations, and the specific effects of the crisis could be 
gauged on firms classified as such, using a more complete panel of firm-years and more detailed firm-
level debt information. Finally, the impact of regulatory change after the crisis on the international 
financing of Brazilian companies is unknown and opens a new path for future research.   
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APPENDIX 
 
 
Probit Model Variable Definition 
 
Variable  Definition 
Dependent variables: 
ADRs  Dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the firm issued ADRs 
Eurobonds  Dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the firm issued Eurobonds 
IntBanks  Dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the firm had international bank loans 
Explanatory variables: 
CGI  Score of a corporate governance index created and described in Leal and Carvalhal-da-
Silva (2007a). The index consists of 20 questions. Each question represents a good 
corporate governance practice that can be verified from public filings with the Brazilian 
Securities Commission. A positive answer to a question represents the existence of a 
good corporate governance practice and adds 1 to the index.  
E  Company exports is a dummy variable that assumes the value 1 if a company is an 
exporter 
F  Company foreign shareholder is a dummy variable that assumes the value of 1 if there 
is a relevant foreign shareholder, one with more than 5% of the equity capital 
Q  Tobin’s Q represents growth potential because it is a quotient of the market value of a 
company relative to assets in place, with the excess of market over book value 
representing growth potential. It was computed as the ratio between the market to book 
value of assets; the market value of assets was computed as the market value of equity 
plus the book value of assets minus the book value of equity at year end 
ROA  Return on assets represents asset profitability, disregarding the impact of leverage, 
computed as the ratio of earnings before interest and taxes to total assets  
S  Company size represented by the natural logarithm of total assets 
T  Company asset tangibility denoting the proportion of a company's fixed assets and 
computed as fixed assets over total assets 
V  Company stock volatility is the annualized standard deviation of daily local currency 
stock returns during the year  
 